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**GHETTO AND CAMPUS- TWENTIETH CENTURY
BATTLEGROUNDS**

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
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8 DECEMBER 1972

STUDENT
ESSAY

GHETTO AND CAMPUS -
TWENTIETH CENTURY BATTLEGROUNDS

BY

COLONEL THOMAS N. FITZPATRICK

INFANTRY

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**USAWC RESEARCH ELEMENT
(Essay)**

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TWENTIETH CENTURY BAT LEGROUNDS**

by

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
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The purpose of this essay is to assess the capabilities of military forces to combat civil disorders in the United States. An analysis of the relative effectiveness of the National Guard and Regular U.S. Army forces in recent major civil disturbances is used to assess the strengths and weaknesses of these forces to preserve peace on the campus and in the strife ridden "inner cities" of our nation. Prior planning and the timely use of adequate force, combining the unique qualities of state and federal assets, are concluded to be the appropriate answers when local law enforcement agencies are incapable of maintaining order.

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The use of military force to combat civil disorder within the United States is not a unique phenomena of the twentieth century. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw repeated use of both state and federal forces employed against its own citizens.

The first such incident occurred in 1794 when President Washington consolidated the militias of four states and led them against the "Whiskey Rebels" in western Pennsylvania.¹ Since then literally hundreds of civil disorders have involved the use of military force by either the federal or state governments.

The legal basis for the employment of military force in domestic crisis stems from the Constitution, which grants to Congress the power to "provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions."² Although this is the only specific mention of this authority in the Constitution, additional derivative powers are granted to the President in this respect as he is enjoined to "take care that the laws are faithfully executed,"³ and is designated "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy."⁴ Additionally, the states are specifically guaranteed a republican form of government, which implies the right to defend this guarantee against both internal and external threats.

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, 2d Series, Vol. IV, pp. 82-83.

² United States Constitution, ART I, Section 8.

³ United States Constitution, ART II, Section 2.

⁴ United States Constitution, ART II, Section 3.

Congress has enacted a series of laws which amplify these Presidential powers. On 2 May 1972, Washington was granted authority to move against the "Whiskey Rebels" by Congress which made a limited delegation of its powers enabling the President to call out the militia. In 1807, Congress enacted a law which gave the President the specific power to call forth "such part of the land and naval force of the United States as shall be judged necessary" to be used against "insurrection or enterprise on the public peace."⁵ From that time on the Regular Army became the favorite tool of Presidents for use in civil disorder. Militias continued to be used sparingly by Presidents until 1867 when President Johnson used them to prevent the invasion of Canada by the Fenians. But this marked the last use of state troops in a federal role within the United States until Eisenhower federalized the Arkansas National Guard during the Little Rock crisis in 1957.⁶

Army troops have been called upon almost exclusively in civil disorder in preference to the other Armed Forces simply because they are equipped, organized, located, and in recent years, trained more appropriately for this mission than any of the other forces. The Regular Army was used during the early years in preference to state troops because they were more efficient, were directly controlled by Washington and were available in sufficient numbers to

⁵ Bennet Rich, The Presidents and Civil Disorders, Washington, 1941, pp. 6-16.

⁶ Robin Higham, Bayonets in the Streets, The University Press of Kansas, 1969, p. 26.

do the job. After the Civil War, the state militias degenerated into "social clubs" which did not possess the ability or the spirit to perform any military action more dangerous than "fancy parade."

This ratio was reversed with the passage of The Dick Act in 1903 which marked the birth of the modern National Guard.⁷ It provided the state militias with federal recognition and federal support and established their dual role as soldiers of the state and a ready first line reserve force for federal use in time of national emergency. From that time on the National Guard experienced a steady improvement in efficiency and prestige. Since the end of World War I, the National Guard has performed the major burden of assisting local authorities in maintaining civil order.

Civil disorder has increased alarmingly in the United States during the past twenty years. With the exception of some plant takeovers and other labor problems during World War II, and a racial disorder in Detroit in 1943, the use of military force within the United States during the twentieth century had been relatively rare until 1957. From then until the end of 1970, over 400 separate incidents have occurred which required the use of some military force. SEE TABLES 1, 2 and 3.

Money had been the motivating force in most of the earlier social problems which led to civil disorder and the necessity to apply military force. The great labor problems of the late

⁷Title 10, U.S. Code (Revised), Sec 3500.

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were primarily concerned with pay and other monetary benefits. Contemporary problems also have a monetary correlation in that the problems of the ghettos and the inner cities are partially financial. But two additional ingredients have been responsible for the quantum increase in the frequency, scope and ferocity of the recent disorders. Racial integration and the war in Vietnam have sparked a broader based frustration and dissatisfaction with government, laws, and the status quo, than any other forces in our national history. The future portends more of the same.

Although law enforcement agencies have profited from many of their earlier mistakes and have used the infusion of federal funds to improve their ability to handle their own problems, the continued use of military force is inevitable. A Department of the Army Study Group, in a report prepared in 1970, predicts that for the first five years of this decade (1970-75), the probability of employing federal forces will decrease but the use of National Guard troops is very likely.⁸ SEE TABLE 4.

The underlying cause of social disorder is beyond the scope of this paper. However, Walter Millis summarized the situation in relation to the military rather succinctly in his book, "Arms and the State."

"The modern democratic state is more or less inexorably a monolithic structure. It is

⁸ U.S. Department of the Army Study Group Final Report. CSM 7-343, CMD 1970.

devoted, as the Constitution declares, to the twin objectives of providing for the common defense and promoting the general welfare. In the long international isolation of the nineteenth century, it was possible to separate the two and largely to forget the common defense in the pursuit of the general welfare. It is possible no longer; today the common defense has taken on an immediacy and urgency which it had not possessed since the early days of the Republic. If the institutions involving, or expressing the military and non-military factors in the national life are to be brought into a proper relationship, it will have to be done in terms other than those which seemed appropriate to the past.⁹

CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLES OF MILITARY CIVIL DISORDER OPERATIONS

Three of the most significant contemporary civil disorders have been selected for analysis and evaluation to provide a basis for determining the effectiveness of the various military forces to perform civil disorder missions.

Little Rock was chosen because it marked the first use of state troops in a domestic federal role in almost a hundred years. Further, it marked the beginning of the contemporary series of citizen-soldier confrontations.

Watts is probably the most comprehensive and successful operation of this type which was handled exclusively by the National Guard.

⁹ Walter Millis, Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy, pp. 413-414.

Detroit (1967) was the scene of a National Guard operation which failed and required the assistance of federal troops to restore order.

LITTLE ROCK:¹⁰

On 17 May 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that racial discrimination in public education was unconstitutional. On 31 May of the following year, the high court amplified this decision. It gave local authorities the task of eliminating racial discrimination in the schools and charged the Federal District Courts to see that they did so. The Little Rock School Board announced its decision to comply with the Supreme Court decision late in 1954 and began work on a plan which would initiate actual integration of the city schools commencing with the 1957-58 school year. After months of careful planning and screening of students, it was decided that nine black students would be registered and enrolled in the previously all white Central High School on 3 September 1957. On 2 September, Governor Faubus ordered to active duty certain elements of the Arkansas National Guard, citing that he had been furnished information that violence was imminent in Little Rock should integration be carried out. The enrollment of the nine black students was delayed until 4 September. Meanwhile,

¹⁰ US Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, Monograph #158M, Operation Arkansas, 1967.

Federal District Judge Davies ordered that integration at Central High School proceed forthwith. On 4 September, the nine students attempted to enter the school and were turned away by National Guard troops. This action triggered a complex series of court orders, threats, counter-threats and investigations which were culminated by President Eisenhower's decision to use military force to enforce the court ordered integration. Consequently, the entire National Guard of Arkansas was federalized and a reinforced Airborne Battle Group of U.S. troops was flown to Little Rock, Arkansas, from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, on 24 September. The following day the integration of Central High School became fact. Under the protection of U.S. troops, backed up by the federalized National Guard, the nine students attended classes virtually without incident. The original force totalled more than 3000 ground troops supported during the movement phase by several hundred U.S. Air Force personnel. The force remained intact until late October when selected National Guard units were returned to state control and, simultaneously, some regular forces were returned to their home stations. Final withdrawal did not occur until the end of the school year the following May.

Little Rock is atypical of the later disorders in that no loss of life or property damage occurred. But it does point out several things that were reinforced during later incidents.

The use of Regular U.S. forces is far more effective than National Guard troops, at least in the initial stages of the

confrontation. Part of this advantage is clearly psychological. Part of it is based on practical fact. The Regular forces are better trained and better prepared psychologically to apply force in the accomplishment of their mission. The Regular force comprises a homogeneous mixture of race and regional origin within the United States. Consequently, they are less likely to have any deep personal involvement in the local issues. The National Guard, on the other hand, also possesses some unique assets. They are familiar with the local area and the local populace. In many states, the National Guard has developed an excellent reputation for public service during natural disasters and is highly respected. But the most important lesson that is to be learned from Little Rock is that the speed and potency of the initial reaction determines the outcome of the operation in terms of loss of life and property. Ignoring these lessons in later crises resulted in disastrous losses.

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WATTS:

On 11 August 1965, a California Highway Patrol apprehended Marquette Frye, a Negro, for a routine traffic violation in the Watts district of Los Angeles. As the patrolmen administered routine sobriety tests, a crowd of local black citizens gathered

11 Spenser Crump, Black Riot in Los Angeles: The Story of Watts Tragedy, Los Angeles, 1966.

to watch. Frye's mother appeared and began to berate her son. Things became tense as Frye resisted arrest and the patrolmen applied force. Frye's mother then assaulted one of the patrolmen. They then arrested her also. By this time, the crowd numbered in the hundreds and was growing rapidly. Rumors were passed that the officers had abused a pregnant black woman. The crowd became restive and began pelting the police with refuse and attempted to free the prisoners. The police extricated themselves and their prisoners from the crowd amid a hail of rocks, bottles and epithets. But the crowd, now a mob, turned angrily on any and all whites in the area and began to burn and loot neighborhood stores in an emotional frenzy of "Black Power." Police reinforcements were called to seal off the area. But they were woefully inadequate for the task.

The situation continued to deteriorate during the night. After noon the following day, the California National Guard was mobilized in its armories and at 4:30 P.M. was committed to restore order in Watts. By fortunate coincidence, the California 40th Armored Division was in an unusually high state of readiness. It was preparing for its annual two-week summer encampment at Camp Roberts and had already accumulated in its armories the rations and other supplies which would be needed for the trip. One brigade was already on the road moving toward Camp Roberts when the emergency call came. California's other division, the 49th Infantry, in northern California, was preparing for a weekend exercise. The Air

National Guard was operating its bases on a full time basis as part of its annual training. Because of this high degree of readiness, over 1000 National Guardsmen were already on duty when the emergency was declared and the remainder were mobilized in record time.

By 11:00 P.M., Guard forces were emplacing road blocks, assisting wounded civilians and working in coordination with the police and fire departments to restore law and order. Mopping up continued for two days before complete order was restored, but the riot was effectively under control within hours after the National Guard was committed to the area. Thirty-four people lost their lives and 40 million dollars worth of damage was sustained during the rioting.

The California National Guard was heartily praised for its effectiveness and professionalism during the crisis by both State and Federal officials; several individual Guardsmen were decorated for bravery. Discounting the fact that the timing of the crisis was in its favor and that a large number of troops were already on duty when the mobilization call came, it performed an admirable feat of mobilizing the balance of the force and deploying it into the troubled area. Command and control procedures were adequate and coordination and cooperation between units and with other state agencies was superb. The Air National Guard recalled aircraft from distant points and arranged for active Air Force craft to assist in air lifting the northern division to the Los Angeles area.

Upon arrival in Los Angeles, the troops were transported to Watts in borrowed school busses. Commanders and staffs were furnished vehicles and communications by Los Angeles Army Reserve units. An Air Commando Squadron of the California Air National Guard assisted in providing communications for the ground forces and later supported prisoner processing operations. Training and prior planning were credited in the after action report of the crisis, prepared by LTC Hill, California Adjutant General, as the primary factors which enabled the Guard to perform so effectively and which enabled it to avert even greater loss of life and property.¹² Had the call for assistance been issued 24 hours sooner, it is estimated that losses would have been minimal.

DETROIT (1967)¹³

Ten years after the successful Little Rock operation, Detroit, Michigan, experienced the most disastrous (in terms of life and property damage) in recent times. During this ten year period, the United States was plagued with disorders. But local officials were learning valuable lessons in how to avert or cope with civil unrest. Military forces were gaining both knowledge and experience in the handling of dissidents.

¹² Military Support of Law Enforcement During Civil Disturbances, Sacramento, August 1965, p. 53. This is the official history of the California National Guard in the Watts Riot.

¹³ "An American Tragedy, 1967-Detroit," Newsweek, 7 August 1967, pp. 18-31.

The summer of 1967 had already produced racially oriented riots in Newark, New Jersey, and most large cities were tense. In late July, Detroit police conducted an early morning raid on an illegal speakeasy along westside's Twelfth Street and arrested about seventy black citizens. Although it was 4:00 A.M. on a Sunday morning, rumors quickly spread through the area that the police had badly beaten the black prisoners. A crowd quickly formed and the police were assaulted with verbal abuse and stones. The police successfully spirited away their prisoners but the crowd turned to arson and looting of the neighborhood stores. Rioting, looting and arson by both blacks and whites spread rapidly throughout the city and eventually to other cities in Michigan. Some 8000 National Guard troops were hurriedly called out to assist the police in handling arrests and to protect firemen from snipers as they attempted to control over 1000 fires which had been started by the mob.

National Guard troops were deployed throughout the city during Sunday afternoon and evening. But by midnight it was apparent that the situation was beyond their control. Governor Romney and Detroit Mayor Cavanaugh recognized the need for federal assistance. But for political reasons too complex for treatment in this paper, they did not arrive until just before midnight on the following day when two airborne brigades of federal troops were deployed and the Michigan National Guard was federalized. By Wednesday night, the city was under control, but 39 persons had died and property damage exceeded 200 million dollars.

General Stone, who served as Deputy Task Force Commander, cited in his after action report the delay in deploying federal forces as the primary deficiency in the operation. He praised the National Guard forces for their bravery and dedication. But he cited inadequate training and poor command and control procedures ¹⁴ in the initial stages of the engagement.

The National Guard can and should be employed. With better training and with better command and control they are adequate to the task. We must anticipate and accept that they will not and can not be as effective as Regular troops, particularly at the beginning.

General Stone also recognized a need for greater integration of ¹⁵ the National Guard.

Every effort must be made to provide greater integration of Negro personnel into our units. We must launch a major campaign to attract qualified Negro youth into the National Guard, for units that have a reasonable number of Negroes assigned to them are more acceptable to the Negro community and can probably be more effective in dealing with other Negroes who are rioting.

The Detroit Free Press was less kind to the Michigan National Guard, however. In an editorial printed shortly after the riots began, it castigated the Guard for its inadequacy: ¹⁶

¹⁴ Hearings Before Special Subcommittee to Inquire into the Capability of the National Guard to Cope with Civil Disturbances, House of Representatives, Ninetieth Congress, First Session, 10, 11, 15, 22, 23, 24, 25 August and 3 October 1967. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967, pp. 5683 5688.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ "How to Control Riots," Detroit Free Press, Vol. 137, No. 85, 29 July 1967, p. 8A.

"In Detroit, we have a graphic example of the skill and capability of National Guardsmen as compared with U.S. troops. The Guard has been securing the city's west side where vicious sniper activity continued Tuesday and Wednesday night. The U.S. troops were assigned to the east side where only sporadic gunfire was heard.

The U.S. troops, battle-trained, hardened and tested, are far better prepared to bring law and order into a troubled city than a National Guard unit, sprinkled with raw recruits fresh from their first summer encampment...."

General Stone's after action report provides a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of the organization, equipment, training, doctrine, and psychological preparation of Regular Army forces for employment in civil disorders. Further, it provides a contrast of the relative effectiveness of federal versus National Guard forces for this mission. In addition to the points previously made, General Stone concludes that doctrine outlined in current regulations and training manuals is more than adequate to prepare troops for this type of mission. He cites one important exception: the doctrine and training for combat in urban areas.

Most of our doctrine is based on the World War II tactics of bypassing built-up areas by forward troops whenever possible and assigning the mission of mopping up these by-passed areas to follow-on units. The tactics to be used by these follow-on units is rather hazy and incomplete. Further, the equipment issued to combat units to fight the main battle are, in some respects, inadequate for the house to house fighting experienced in urban areas.

Although current organizations, doctrine, and equipment appear to be adequate for civil disorder operations, some shortcomings do exist. As General Stone pointed out, our training and equipment suffers some deficiencies should we face a determined group of rioters requiring house to house operations. An extensive study of this problem has been underway at the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia¹⁷ for more than a year. Although incomplete, many important facts have been discovered by this study.

The infantry family of radio communication equipment currently in use is frequency modulated, which requires line of sight operation. Their capabilities are severely limited by the large buildings and other obstructions of modern cities.

The standard issue M-16 rifle does not have the penetrating power of .30 caliber weapons and is unable to penetrate the concrete and steel construction of many modern buildings.

Combat training for urban area fighting is largely conducted in classrooms or in wooden structures which depict the configuration of the typical small European village and bears little or no resemblance to the American "inner city" or college campus.

¹⁷ Unpublished. For information concerning this study, write to Commandant, US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia 31905.

Topographic materials are inadequate for use in city fighting. Maps and charts of the sewers, plumbing and electrical systems of major cities and campuses should be available to local commanders.

CONCLUSIONS

The three examples cited provide the basis for an evaluation of the effectiveness of U.S. and National Guard forces to combat civil disorders.

ADVANTAGES OF U.S. FORCES:

Higher state of training.

Higher density of troops with recent combat experience.

More effective command and staff operations (at least initially).

Homogeneous racial and regional origin.

Greater speed of employment (once the decision is made to do so).

Direct control from Washington.

Psychological attitude of citizens toward Regular troops.

ADVANTAGES OF NATIONAL GUARD:

Familiarity with local geography and populace.

Reputation derived from civic action.

Ease of callup by state officials.

Each situation must be judged on its own merits and the proper mix of force applied to produce the desired results. But the experiences of the recent past indicate that the greatest loss of life and property result when insufficient force is applied or when there are delays in the application of force. Prior planning for employment in likely areas provided a definite advantage to the force commander, as evidenced in the Watts operation where rapid coordination between various state agencies, based upon prior planning, partially overcame a serious delay in calling for military assistance.



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FEDERAL TROOP OPERATIONS IN CONUS

YEAR	LOCATION	SITUATION
1907	Nevada	Labor
1914	Colorado	Labor
1919	Washington, DC Omaha, NB Gary, IL, etc	Racial Racial Labor
1921	West Virginia	Labor
1932	Washington, DC	Bonus Army
1943	Detroit, MI	Racial
1957	Little Rock, AK	Racial
1962	Oxford, MS	Racial
1967	Detroit, MI	Racial
1968	Washington, DC Baltimore, MD Washington, DC Chicago, IL	Defense of Federal Property Racial Racial Racial
1969	Washington, DC	Civil Disturbance Prepositioning
1970	New York City New Haven Washington, DC Washington, DC	Civil Disturbance Prepositioning Essential Services Civil Disturbance Prepositioning Civil Disturbance Prepositioning Defense of Federal Property Prepositioning

Prepared from data extracted from Department of the Army Study Group final report CSM 7-343-CMD-1970.

TABLE 1

**EMPLOYMENT OF NATIONAL GUARD IN STATE STATUS
1945-1970**

YEAR	TIMES EMPLOYED	TOTAL TROOPS EMPLOYED
1945-1959	55	33,539
1960-1964	33	65,867
1965	17)	25,051
1966	17)	18,598
1967	40) 248	43,300
1968	107)	150,000
1969	67)	49,264
1970 (Jan - May)	43)	41,046

TABLE 2

EMPLOYMENT OF NATIONAL GUARD IN CONUS IN FEDERAL STATUS

YEAR	LOCATION	OCCURRENCE
1957	Arkansas	Little Rock School Integration Crisis
1962	Mississippi	University Integration Disorders
1963	Mississippi	University Integration Disorders
	Alabama	Racial Disturbances in Birmingham
	Alabama	University Integration Disorders
	Alabama	School Integration Disorders in Three Cities
1965	Alabama	Civil Rights March-Selma to Montgomery
1967	Detroit, Michigan	Racial Disorder
1968	Chicago, Illinois	Racial Disorder
	Baltimore, Maryland	Racial Disorder
	Washington, DC	Racial Disorder
1970	New York, New York	Postal Strike

TABLES 2 and 3 were prepared from data extracted from Department of the Army Study Group final report CSM 7-343-CMD-1970.

TABLE 3

FIVE YEAR PROJECTION (LIKELIHOOD OF EMPLOYMENT)
1970-1975

	POLICE	NATIONAL GUARD	ACTIVE FEDERAL FORCES
Racial Disturbances	Very Likely	Likely	Not Likely
Student Disturbances	Very Likely	Likely	Not Likely
Mass Demonstrations with Associated Violence	Very Likely	Likely	Not Likely
Political Terrorism and Urban Guerrilla Warfare	Very Likely	Not Likely	Not Likely
Labor Disturbances	Very Likely	Likely	Not Likely
Developing Sources of Civil Disturbances	Very Likely	Not Likely	Not Likely
Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies	Very Likely	Very Likely	Not Likely

Very Likely: Constant impact on the security force in question.

Likely: Probability of sporadic impact on the security force in question.

Not Likely: Remote or little probable impact on the security force in question

Prepared from data extracted from Department of the Army Study Group final report CSM 7-343-CMD-1970.

TABLE 4

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